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Showing 5 results for Kant
Saeed Hajrashidian, Ali Salmani,
Volume 4, Issue 14 (5-2015)
Abstract
One of Kant’s basic concern in the critique
of judgment is teleology. Purpose as subject
of investigation in Aristotle and his followers
was completely put aside in the justification
of world by the modern philosophers such
as Descartes and Spinoza. Kant as the leader
of modern philosophy in the Critique of
Judgment again comes back to purpose and
purposiveness. He believes that teleology is
the principle of reflective faculty of judgment.
This paper concerns with this problem that
whether the concept of teleology, raised with metaphysical tint from the start, has any
connection with purpose and purposiveness in
the third moment or not? If this connection is
proved, what will its results be?
Mona Fazeli, Masoud Olia,
Volume 4, Issue 16 (12-2015)
Abstract
This paper considers two questions regarding Kant’s theory of taste: first, considering the accompanying presence of subjective and intersubjective elements in Kant’s theory of taste, what relation does he establish between the subjective and intersubjective aspects of the judgment of taste? The first part of this paper addresses this question through the examination of logical characteristics of the judgment, and discusses that the judgment of taste, in Kant’s account, is an aesthetic judgment which on one hand, is made in total freedom and autonomy of the judging subject, and on the other hand, contains a special kind of universality in its content. Kant calls this special universality by the names of subjective universality, aesthetic universality, and general validity. Having illustrated this relation, the paper turns to the second question which asks: How does Kant manage to establish this relation between the subjective and intersubjective aspects of the judgment of taste? In this regard, it is argued in the second part that, although Kant believes in the subjectivity of the judgment of taste, he regards this subjectivity as a special kind, of which the intersubjectivity is the other side. This point is demonstrated by first clarifying the meaning of the specific subjectivity of the judgment of taste, and then by showing the intersubjective aspect of this subjectivity. Finally, it is suggested that on the basis of the intersubjective universality which is contained in the judgments of taste, Kant views the faculty of taste as a potential which enables empathy between the subjects and de-isolation of them.
Mehdi Khabbazi Kenari, Safa Sebti,
Volume 6, Issue 22 (5-2017)
Abstract
In Kant’ viewpoint, beauty is neither objective nor does it rely on concepts, but it is the subject that establishes the judgment of aesthetic in object of art. Kant believes that the feeling of pleasure in judgment of taste arises from reflective judgment of the subject of judgment. He argues that art is distinguished form nature, science and craft, and divides it into mechanical art, pleasant art and beautiful art. Pleasant art is a kind of art whose purpose is just pleasure, while the criteria of judgment in beautiful art is reflective judgment. The work of beautiful art is the product of author’s genius through form. From the perspective of ideas Kant divides fine arts into three kinds: art of speech, visual art (Including plastic art and painting) and art of the beautiful play of sensations. According to his description of certain use of the object as a condition that limits the aesthetical ideas, it seems that handicrafts are sub- architecture, and should be regarded as plastic art. But given the wide range of handicraft products, from mass production to unique objects with aesthetical features, and from useful to the decorative, they cannot all be equally judged as craft. This research seeks to analyze aesthetically the range of crafts based on the concepts explained in “Critique of Judgment”. This this way it distinguishes the field of art and non-art in the productions of handicraft and introduces areas of pleasant art and fine art in objects of handicraft.
Milad Roshani Payan,
Volume 7, Issue 28 (12-2018)
Abstract
The cinematographic frame is a boundary which separates the image from the external world. From an ontological viewpoint which dates back to Greek philosophy, the boundary of a thing separates it from other things, thus leading to its ontological independence from other things. But, according to this point of view, the being of things as external objects is considered to be free from the impact of subjective interference and the experience of the viewer. This idea was radically changed with Kant’s Copernican revolution. By separating the Thing in Itself from the Phenomena, Kant, on the one hand, announced that the object of human cognition is only the Phenomena, and on the other hand, that they are knowable only to the extent that they are known under the a priori subjective factors, i.e. the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding. The first purpose of this paper is to show the limitations of the traditional concepts of the cinematographic frame according to the subjective perception of the viewer. The second objective is to ask how it is possible not to regard this perception as just a mental perception, but a corporeal one. Finally, the results of this investigation are considered in the analysis of the corporeal perception of the cinematographic frame.
Somayeh Ramezanmahi,
Volume 14, Issue 54 (7-2025)
Abstract
During the flourishing of the Enlightenment, Kant attributed to beauty an identity distinct from morality and reason, elaborating on its various dimensions. In the Critique of Judgment, by examining judgments of taste, Kant delineates the boundary between the beautiful and the sublime and elucidates their independent role in attaining universal cognition. However, he remains silent on the concept of ugliness. Given that the embodiment of ugliness occupies a significant portion of artistic works, this article seeks to critique and analyze the role of ugliness in achieving universal cognition within Kantian aesthetics, as interpreted by his commentators. Employing a qualitative, descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing on library and documentary sources, this study addresses the following question: What is the relationship between ugliness and universal cognition from a Kantian perspective?
The findings indicate that while there are two divergent interpretations among Kantian commentators, the conceptualization of ugliness can be grounded in a more profound negation. Accordingly, negative judgments of taste belong to the category of reflective aesthetic judgments and can be analyzed through the fourfold structure of judgments of taste as follows: Quality: Displeasure devoid of interest (interesselose Unlust), Quantity: Equivalent to universal validity, Relation: Counter-purposiveness (Zweckwidrigkeit) without a purpose, Modality: Necessarily displeasing. Thus, ugliness embodies a negative purposiveness that generates a discordant free play between the faculties of imagination and understanding. Although more complex, this dissonance may ultimately aspire to harmony.
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