This paper considers two questions regarding Kant’s theory of taste: first, considering the accompanying presence of subjective and intersubjective elements in Kant’s theory of taste, what relation does he establish between the subjective and intersubjective aspects of the judgment of taste? The first part of this paper addresses this question through the examination of logical characteristics of the judgment, and discusses that the judgment of taste, in Kant’s account, is an aesthetic judgment which on one hand, is made in total freedom and autonomy of the judging subject, and on the other hand, contains a special kind of universality in its content. Kant calls this special universality by the names of subjective universality, aesthetic universality, and general validity. Having illustrated this relation, the paper turns to the second question which asks: How does Kant manage to establish this relation between the subjective and intersubjective aspects of the judgment of taste? In this regard, it is argued in the second part that, although Kant believes in the subjectivity of the judgment of taste, he regards this subjectivity as a special kind, of which the intersubjectivity is the other side. This point is demonstrated by first clarifying the meaning of the specific subjectivity of the judgment of taste, and then by showing the intersubjective aspect of this subjectivity. Finally, it is suggested that on the basis of the intersubjective universality which is contained in the judgments of taste, Kant views the faculty of taste as a potential which enables empathy between the subjects and de-isolation of them.